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ANDREvV W. MARTIN, Respondent, v. A. H. HENDEl~­
SON, as Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles, 
etc., et al., Appellants. 
GEORGE H. REDWINE, Respondent, v. A. H. HENDER-
SON, as Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles, 
etc., rt al., Appellants. 
[1] Civil Service- Persons Included.- Officers of the highway 
patrol are included within civil service ( Const., art XXIV, 
§ 4[a]) and come within the definition of the word "em-
ployee" for purposes of the State Civil Service Act. (Stats. 
1937, ch. 753, § 8, p. 2086; now Gov. Code, § 18526.) 
[2] Public Officers-Compensation.-A person accepting a public 
office with a fixed salary is bound to perform the duties of 
the office for the salary, and he cannot legally claim addi-
tional compensation for discharge of these duties, even though 
the salary may be a very inadequate remuneration for the 
services, and even though subsequent statutes or ordinances 
have increased his duties but not his salary. 
[3] Labor-Hours of Public Employees.-When a public employee 
is paid by time, as by the day, week or month, rather than 
by the amount of work which he does, he is bound, in the 
absence of statute, to render services without regard to the 
number of hours worked. 
[ 4] !d.-Hours of Public Employees-Compensation for Overtime. 
-In the absence of a statutory provision therefor, time off 
granted for work done by a state employee in excess of 
reasonable work hours is not granted as of right, but is 
allowed in accordance with necessities of the duties to be 
performed (former Pol. Code,§ 350; now Gov. Code,§ 11152), 
and the fact that normal hours of work are established and 
compensating time off is provided for work beyond those 
hours does not of itself give the employee a right to pay-
ment for overtime. 
[5] Civil Service-Statutory Regulation.-The terms and condi· 
tions of civil service employment are fixed by statute and 
not by contract. 
l2] See Cal.Jur., Public Officers, § 106; Am.Jur., Public Officers, 
§ :141 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Civil Service, § 3; [2] Public Offi-
cers, §106; [3,4] Labor, §4.5; [5,6] Civil Service, §1; [7-11] 
Civil Service, § 8; [12] Judgments, § 9(5). 
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[6] !d.-Statutory Regulation.-The statutory provisions control-
ling terms and conditions of civil service employment cannot 
be circumvented by purported contracts in conflict therewith. 
[7a, 7b] !d.-Compensation-Overtime Work.-The enactment of 
State Civil Service Act, § 150.5, effective February 6, 1943 
(Stats. 1943, ch. 20, § 2, p. 136; now Gov. Code, § 18005), 
and the addition of §§ 73, 73.5 to the act, effective June 7, 
1943 ( Stats. 1943, ch. 1041, §§ 1, 2, pp. 2976, 2977; now Gov. 
Code, §§ 18020-18024), providing a comprehensive system of 
overtime computation and compensation, did not 'create a 
right to payment for overtime previously worked; the stat-
utes were not, and could not be, retroactive. (Disapproving 
language in Howard v. Lampton, 87 Cal.App.2d 449, 457, 459, 
197 P.2d 69, implying that Gov. Code, § 18005, may be ap-
plied retroactively.) 
[8] !d.-Compensation-Overtime Work.-Services performed by 
highway patrolmen prior to February 6, 1943, the effective 
date of State Civil Service Act, § 150.5, were such as they 
were bound to render for their fixed monthly salaries, and 
under the prohibition of Const., art. IV, § 32, declaring that 
the Legislature shall have no power to grant extra compensa-
tion or allowance to any public officer under any agreement 
made without express authority of law, they could be granted 
no extra compensation for such services. (Disapproving 
Howard v. Lampton, 87 Cal.App.2d 449, 197 P.2d 69, and 
Clark v. State Personnel Board, 56 Cal.App.2d 499, 133 P.2d 
11, insofar as they determine that a state officer or employee, 
in absence of specific statutory authority, is entitled to a cash 
payment for accrued overtime on separation from service.) 
[9] !d.-Compensation-Overtime Work-Limitation of Actions. 
-Gov. Code, § 19630, declaring that no action shall be brought 
for wrongs or grievances based on or related to any state 
civil service law unless commenced within one year after 
cause of action first arose, is the statute of limitations ap-
plicable to salary claims of employees or those who have 
been separated from service, and controls the time for bring-
ing any action on a claim for overtime services. 
[10] !d.-Compensation-Overtime Work-Limitation of Actions. 
-In view of State Civil Service Act, § 150.5 (now Gov. Code, 
§ 18005}, authorizing payment for previous overtime work 
on employee's separation from service without fault on his 
part, no cause of action to compel payment of overtime claims 
for services performed by highway patrolmen in excess of 
their regular hours of duty accrued to them prior to their 
separation from service, since until that date they might have 
been given compensating time off whenever their departmental 
[7] See Cal.Jur., Civil Service, § 6; Am.Jur., Civil Service, § 17. 
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sup~:riors rkemed it convenient to the ;;ervice, and a right to 
comp(~l action by the department would accrue to such patrol-
men only in the event uncompensated overtime remained on 
their separation from service. 
[11] !d.-Compensation-Overtime Work-Limitation of Actions. 
-The availability of an action for declaratory relief does 
not affect the period of limitations commencing on a state 
department's breach of its obligation to pay for accumulated 
overtime on an employee's separation from the service. 
[12] Judgments-Declaratory Judgments-Defenses-Limitations. 
-The period of limitations applicable to ordinary actions 
at law and suits in equity should be applied in like manner 
to actions for declaratory relief. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sac-
ramento County. John Quincy Brown, Judge. Affirmed in 
part and reversed in part. 
Proceeding in mandamus to compel approval of claims 
for overtime work by state employees. Judgment granting 
writ reversed insofar as it directs approval of claims in 
excess of enumerated amounts; affirmed in all other respects. 
Fred N. Howser and Edmund G. Brown, Attorneys Gen-
eral, and Wilmer W. Morse, Deputy Attorney General, for 
Appellants. 
James H. Phillips for Respondents. 
EDMONDS, J.-For a number of years, Andrew \V. Mar-
tin was a traffic sergeant and George H. Redwine a traffic 
officer of the State Highway Patrol. They worked in excess 
of regular hours of duty without receiving equivalent time 
off. After the termination of their employment, Martin and 
Redwine each filed a petition to compel the appropriate state 
official to approve his claim for overtime. The appeal is 
from a judgment requiring approval and payment of the 
claims. 
The facts are undisputed. During the entire period of 
service, the monthly salary of each petitioner was fully paid. 
Martin worked about 500 hours in excess of his regular hours 
of duty, 100 of them being worked between February 6 and 
September 29, 1943. Redwine's excess hours of duty totaled 
332, all but 33 of them being served before February 6, 1943. 
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Martin retired on April 30, 1947. Redwine's separation 
from service was on March 16, 1947. 
Headquarters General Order No. 295, issued by the chief 
of the highway patrol, effective October 1, 1939, provided: 
''Employees ordered to work beyond the hours ordinarily 
required or hours overtime in addition to what is considered 
their regular full day's work, may be allowed time off on 
the day following or at some other convenient time in lieu 
of the overtime hours worked. Overtime hours shall be ad-
justed by the immediate superior of the employee affected 
and shall not become a part of the Headquarters' record.'' 
Order No. 295 was canceled by Headquarters General Order 
No. 394 effective August 5, 1942. The new order read: "Em-
ployees ordered to work beyond the hours ordinarily required 
and considered as a full days work may be allowed com-
pensating time off in lieu of such overtime worked. Such 
overtime hours may be granted and adjusted by the immedi-
ate superior of the employee affected and shaH not become 
a part of the Headquarters record.'' 
On June 5, 1945, the chief of the highway patrol issued 
Information Bulletin No. 323, requiring that any claim for 
overtime hours accumulated prior to September 29, 1943, 
must be reported to the department in writing, accompanied 
by evidence in affidavit form supporting the claim. Failure 
to present a claim in the form outlined by June 30 would 
constitute a waiver of any claim for such overtime hours. 
Each of the petitioners complied with the requirements of 
this bulletin by timely filing a claim in the specified form. 
Thereafter, on August 21, 1945, Headquarters Information 
Bulletin No. 329 was issued rejecting each and all of the 
claims presented pursuant to Bulletin No. 323. Following 
a list of reasons for the rejection of the claims, Bulletin No. 
329 stated that ''it is not believed that the State is privileged 
at this time either to grant compensating time off for over-
time hours ... worked prior to September 29, 1943, or to 
pay an employee the cash equivalent thereof on separation 
or otherwise. Accordingly, liability therefor is hereby denied 
and no such overtime credit will be recognized . . . and any 
and all overtime hours . . . accumulated or claimed to have 
been accumulated prior to September 29, 1943, are hereby 
eancelled. '' 
Rule 12 of the State Personnel Board, adopted June 17, 
1938, with reference to the pay plan for the state civil service 
provided for pay schedules. Section 2 (c) of the rule stated 
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that: "The rates of pay set forth in the pay schedules, un-
less otherwise indicated in such schedules, represent the total 
compensation in every form." It was also provided in sec-
tion 2 (h) that: "When the rate of pay is in terms of dol-
lars a month no additional payment for overtime shall be 
made to any employee for services rendered by him in the 
same department, whether in the discharge of his ordinary 
duties or for any other duties which may be imposed upon 
him or which he may undertake or volunteer to discharge 
or perform." On October 18, 1940, section 2 (h) of rule 
12 was amended to read : ''When the rate of pay is in terms 
of dollars a months no additional payment for overtime shall 
be made to any employee for services rendered by him m 
the same classification in the same department.'' 
Effective February 6, 1943, section 150.5 was added to 
the State Civil Service Act (Stats. 1937, ch. 753) providing: 
"Upon a separation from service, without fault on his part, 
a person shall be entitled to a lump sum payment as of the 
time of separation ... for any time off to which the person 
is entitled by reason of previous overtime work where com-
pensating time off for overtime work is provided for by the 
appointing power or by the rules of the board. Such sums 
shall be computed by projecting the accumulated time on 
a calendar basis so that the lump sum will equal the amount 
to which the employee would have been paid had he taken 
the time off but not separated from the service." (Stats. 
1943, ch. 20, § 2, p. 136; now Gov. Code, § 18005.) 
The petition of Rerlwine, filed March 11, 1948, asked that 
the respondent state officers be required to approve and pay 
his claim for overtime on the basis of the amount of salary 
he was receiving at the time he left the , state service. By 
petition filed on April 21, 1948, Martin sought the same 
relief. The answer of the respondents denied that any amount 
was due for overtime. They alleged that any accumulated 
ovPrtime hours had been canceled hy departmental action 
and that the causes of action are barred by various statutory 
provisions. 
Upon trial the superior court, by writ of mandate, directed 
that the respondents approve Martin's claim in the amount 
of $872.95 and Redwine's for $512.44, the respective cash 
values of the claimed overtime. The appeal is from that 
judgment. 
In support of their appeal, the respondents contend that, 
insofar as hours worked prior to February 6, 1943, are con-
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cerned, Martin and Redwine were paid monthly salaries 
which, by statute, constituted compensation in full for all 
services which might be rendered by them. Prior to that 
date, they say, there was no statutory provision for overtime 
compensation and none could be allowed in the absence of 
statute. The respondents also argue that the claims are 
barred by the statute of limitations, regardless of whether 
the hours were worked prior or subsequent to February 6, 
1943. Even if Martin and Redwine are entitled to a cash 
payment for overtime worked prior to February 6, 1943, 
the respondents say, the amount should be computed upon 
the basis of each officer's salary as of the time the hours were 
worked, rather than as of the time of separation. 
Martin and Redwine rely upon Howard v. Lampton, 87 
Cal.App.2d 449 [197 P.2d 69], and Clark v. State Personnel 
Board, 56 Cal.App.2d 499 [133 P.2d 11]. These decisions 
were based, by analogy, upon Pohle v. Christian, 21 Cal.2d 
83 [130 P.2d 417], in which it was held that a civil service 
employee, upon separation from service without fault on his 
part, is entitled to a cash payment for accumulated vacation 
time. The basis for the conclusion in the Pohle case was the 
statutory provision giving each officer and employee of the 
state a right to a vacation of specified, duration. (Former 
Pol. Code, § 359c; cf. Gov. Code, § 18050.) In accordance 
with former seCtion 359d of the Political Code (now Gov. 
Code, § 18052), the State Personnel Board had provided for 
payment upon separation for unused portions of vacation 
time. (State Personnel Board Rule 13, § 4.) The court 
held that, because the applicable sections of the Political Code 
''do not expressly or otherwise provide that an employee 
having the right to a vacation loses his right to compensa-
tion for that time upon being separated from the service'' 
he is entitled to payment for unused vacation time. (P. 90.) 
The Clark case followed the Pohle decision insofar as pay-
ment for accumulated vacation time was concerned. The 
court then held that, despite the absence of any statutory 
provision granting time off for overtime work and a rule 
of the Personnel Board specifically prohibiting payment for 
overtime, a state employee may be paid upon separation from 
service for accumulated overtime hours. It said: "We see 
no difference in principle between allowing an employee a 
cash payment for accrued vacation time upon his separation 
from the service, and allowing him, upon such separation, 
a cash payment in lieu of the compensatory time off to which 
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he may have become entitled because of overtime worked.'' 
The rule regarding payment for overtime hours expressed in 
the Clark case was applied to retired officers of the highway 
patrol in the Howard case, which involved a factual situation 
substantially similar to that here presented. 
The basic fallacy in the Howard and Clark cases was the 
court's assumption that, in the absence of any statutory 
provision, a civil service employee had a right to compensa-
tory time off for overtime work. Those decisions are clearly 
distinguishable from the Pohle case, where the employee had 
a right granted by statute to a specified amount of vacation 
time. 
Prior to February 6, 1943, the effective date of section 
150.5 of the State Civil Service Act, supra, there was no 
statutory provision for overtime compensation. Section 1033 
of the Political Code (now Gov. Code, § 18000) provided: 
''The salaries fixed by law for all state officers, elective or 
appointive, shall be compensation in full for all services ren-
dered in any official capacity or employment whatsoever, dur-
ing their terms of office, and no such officer shall receive for 
his own use any fee or perquisite for the performance of 
any official duty." The same limitation was applied to civil 
service employees by the State Personnel Board (State Per-
sonnel Board Rule 12, § 2 [ c], sttpra) acting under its power 
to "establish and adjust salary ranges." ( Stats. 1937, ch. 
753, § 70, p. 2094; now Gov. Code, § 18850.) Implementing 
this limitation, the board also specifically prohibited addi-
tional payment to any employee for overtime. (State Per-
sonnel Board Rule 12, § 2 [h J, supra.) [1] Officers of the 
hig·hway patrol are included within civil service ( Const., art. 
XXIV, § 4[a]) and come within the definition of the word 
''employee'' for the purposes of the State Civil Service Act. 
(Stats. 1937, ch. 753, § 8, p. 2086; now Gov. Code, § 18526.) 
[2] The statutory and regulatory limitations upon com-
pensation for services are but a codification and application 
to civil servants of the oft-repeated rule "that a person ac-
cepting a public office with a fixed salary is bound to per-
form the duties of the office for the salary. He cannot legally 
claim additional compensation for the discharge of these 
duties, even though the salary may be a very inadequate 
remuneration for the services, nor does it alter the case that 
by subsequent statutes or ordinances his duties are increased, 
and not his salary. His undertaking is to perform the duties 
of his office, whatever they may be, from time to time during 
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his continuance in office for the compensation stipulated, 
whether these duties are diminished or increased; and when-
ever he considers the compensation inadequate he is at lib-
erty to resign." (Dougherty v. Austin, 94 Cal. 601, 629 [28 
P. 834, 29 P. 1092, 16 L.R.A. 161] ; Buck v. City of Eureka, 
109 Cal. 504, 517 [42 P. 243, 30 L.R.A. 409]; McAuliffe v. 
Kane, 54 Cal.App.2d 288, 296 [128 P.2d 932] ; Vogel v. 
White, 134 Cal.App. 252, 254 [25 P.2d 233]; Kilroy v. Whit-
more, 115 Cal.App. 43, 49 [300 P. 851].) 
[3] 'l'he rule applies not only to the duties themselves, as 
in the cases cited, but also to the hours of work. When the 
employee is paid by time, as by the day, week, or month, 
rather than by the amount of work which he does, he is 
bound, in the absence of statute, to render services without 
regard to the number of hours worked. (Robinson v. Dunn, 
77 Cal. 473 [19 P. 878, 11 Am.St.Rep. 297].) Thus, in this 
case, Martin and Redwine, being paid by the month, could 
be required to work whatever number of hours each month 
was necessary for the performance of their duties. The sit-
uation is in no way analogous to that in the Pohle case where 
the vacation was a matter of statutory right. The vacation 
was a period of time when no services could be required al-
though compensation continued to be payable. 
Obviously, efficient management and satisfactory employ-
ment relations require the state to :fix reasonable work hours. 
[4] In the absence of a statutory provision therefor, time 
off granted for work done in excess of those hours is not 
given as of right, but is allowed in accordance with the 
necessities of the duties to be performed. (Former Pol. Code, 
§ 350; now Gov. Code, § 11152; cf. Stats. 1937, ch. 753, § 154, 
p. 2103 ; now Gov. Code, § 18705.) The fact that normal hours 
of work are established and compensating time off is pro-
vided for work beyond those hours does not, of itself, give 
the employee a right to payment for overtime. 
[5] "The terms and conditions of civil service employ-
ment are :fixed by statute and not by contract. (Citations.) 
'When an employee of the state, under civil service, accepts 
a position, he does so with knowledge of the fact that his 
salary, and, indeed, his conduct, are both subject to the law 
governing such matters, as set forth in the statute and 
the rules and regulations of the commission.' (Citations.) 
[6] The statutory provisions controlling the terms and con-
ditions of civil service employment cannot be circumvented 
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by purported contracts in conflict therewith." (Boren v. State 
Personnel Board, 37 Cal.2d 634, 641 [234 P.2d 981] .) 
[7a] The enactment of section 150.5 of the State Civil 
Service Act and the addition of sections 73 and 73.5 to the 
act, effective June 7, 1943 (Stats. 1943, ch. 1041, §§ 1-2, pp. 
2976-2977; now Gov. Code, §§ 18020-18024), providing a com-
prehensive system of overtime computation and compensation, 
did not create a right to payment for overtime previously 
worked. The statutes were not, and could not be, retroactive. 
''The Legislature shall have no power to grant, . . . any 
extra compensation or allowance to any public officer, agent, 
servant, or contractor, after service has been rendered, ... 
in whole or in part, nor to pay, or to authorized the payment 
of, any claim hereafter created against the State, . . . under 
any agreement or contract made without express authority 
of law; and all such unauthorized agreements or contracts 
shall be null and void.'' ( Const., art. IV, § 32.) [8] The 
services performed by Martin and Redwine prior to February 
6, 1943, were such as they were bound to render for their 
fixed monthly salaries. Under the prohibition of the Con-
stitution, they could be granted no extra compensation for 
such services. (Robinson v. Dunn, supra, p. 475.) 
Insofar as Howard v. Lampton, supra, and Clark v. State 
Personnel Board, supra, determine that a state officer or em-
ployee, in the absence of specific statutory authority, is en-
titled to a cash payment for accrued overtime upon separa-
tion from service, they are disapproved. [7b] Also disap-
proved is language in Howard v. Lampton, supra, pp. 457, 459, 
implying that section 18005 of the Government Code may 
be applied retroactively. 
The respondents do not contend that payment could not 
be allowed for hours worked in excess of normal subsequent 
to February 6, 1943, the effective date of section 150.5. How-
ever, they argue that the claims of Martin and Redwine are 
barred in their entirety by the statute of limitations, regard-
less of whether the hours were worked prior or subsequent 
to that date. Because there was no right to payment for 
overtime worked prior to February 6, 1943, this contention 
will be considered only in relation to hours worked after 
that date. 
[9] Section 19630 of the Government Code, as here ma-
terial, provides: "No action or proceeding shall be brought 
by any person having or claiming to have a cause of action 
or complaint or ground for issuance of any complaint or 
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legal remedy for wrongs or grievances based on or related 
to any civil service law in this State or the administration 
thereof unless such action or proceeding is commenced and 
served within one year after such cause of action or com-
plaint or ground for issuance of any writ or legal remedy 
first arose.'' This is the statute of limitations applicable to 
salary claims of employees or those who have been separated 
from service (Philbrick v. State Personnel Board, 53 Cal. 
App.2d 222, 230 [127 P.2d 634]) and controls the time for 
bringing any action upon a claim for overtime services. 
(Broyles v. State Personnel Board, 42 Cal.App.2d 303, 307 
[108 P.2d 714].) 
It is conceded that each of these proceedings was com-
menced within one year after the date of the petitioner's sep-
aration from service. Relying upon Dillon v. Board of Pen-
sion Cornmrs., 18 Cal.2d 427 [116 P.2d 37, 136 A.L.R. 800L 
the respondents contend that the statute commenced to run 
upon August 21, 1945, when the department rejected all 
claims for accumulated overtime. Martin and Redwine argue 
that this contention was concluded by Howard v. Lampton, 
supra, pp. 456-457, which held that the statute did not start 
to run until the date of separation from service. 
In the Dillon case, the question before the court was 
whether the period of limitation upon the right to claim a 
widow's pension commenced to run at the death of the hus-
band or was to be measured from the date each payment of 
the pension would have become due. Holding that the date 
of death was decisive, the court said: ''A cause of action 
accrues when a suit may be maintained thereon, and the 
£tatute of limitations therefore begins to run at that time. 
(Citations.) The cause of action to establish the right to 
a pension accrued to plaintiff at the time of her husband's 
death. At any time following the death she could demand 
a pension from the board and upon refusal could maintain 
a suit to enforce such action." (P. 430.) 
[10] No cause of action to compel the payment of over-
time claims accrued to Martin and Redwine prior to their 
separation from service. Until that date, they might have 
been given compensating time off whenever their depart-
mental superiors deemed it convenient to the service. The 
petitioners had no legal remedy to compel their superiors 
to give them time off at any specific time, or at all. Only 
in the event uncompensated overtime remained upon their 
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separation from service did a right accrue to them to compel 
action by the department. 
The respondents argue, however, that upon the depart-
ment's denial of credits for accumulated overtime a cause 
of action accrued, ''not to compel compensating time off or 
the cash equivalent of time off, but to establish status as a 
person having compensable overtime to his credit usable if, 
as and when compensating time off could be granted.'' In 
essence, this position is that the petitioners had a cause of 
action to establish their right to compensation for overtime 
even if there was no remedy to enforce such right. Although 
no specific reference is made to it, the respondents apparently 
suggest that there might be an action for declaratory relief. 
[11] However, the availability of such an action would 
in no way affect the period of limitations commencing upon 
the department's breach of its obligation to pay for accumu-
lated overtime. [12] As stated in Maguire v. Hibernia Sav. 
& L. Soc., 23 Cal.2d 719 [146 P.2d 673, 151 A.L.R. 1062), "the 
period of limitations applicable to ordinary actions at law 
and suits in equity should be applied in like manner to 
actions for declaratory relief. Thus, if declaratory relief is 
sought with reference to an obligation which has been breached 
and the right to commence an action for 'coercive' relief 
upon the cause of action arising therefrom is barred by the 
statute, the right to declaratory relief is likewise barred. 
On the other hand, if declaratory relief is sought 'before there 
has been a breach of the obligation in respect to which said 
declaration is sought,' or within the statutory period after 
the breach, the right to such relief is not barred by lapse of 
time. (Citations.) There is no anomaly in the fact that 
a party may have a right to sue for declaratory relief with-
out setting in motion the statute of limitations. Quiet title 
actions, forerunners of declaratory actions, may be main-
tained when an adverse claim to property is asserted, but 
the period of limitations does not commence to run at that 
elate." (P. 734.) 
The amounts to which Martin and Redwine are entitled 
are to be computed by ''projecting the accumulated time 
on a calendar basis so that the lump sum will equal the 
amount which [they 1 would have been paid had [they] 
taken the time off but not separated from the service.'' (Gov. 
Code, § 18005.) At the time of his separation from service, 
Martin's salary amounted to $340 per month, or $1.70 per 
hour based upon a 48-hour week. Subsequent to February 6, 
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1943, he accumulated 100% overtime hours, or a sum equal 
to $170.85. Redwine's salary at the time of his separation 
from service was $310 per month, or $1.54 per hour. For 
the 33 hours of accumulated overtime for which he legally 
may claim compensation, he is entitled to $50.82. 
Insofar as the judgment directs the state officials to ap-
prove the petitioners' claims in excess of these enumerated 
amounts, the judgment is reversed. In all other respects, 
it is affirmed, each party to pay his own costs on appeal. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
These cases were correctly decided by the District Court of 
AppE'al, Third Distriet (see Martin v. Lampton, (Cal.App.) 
240 P.2d 21) and I adopt the views there expressed. How-
ever, I desire to eomment on the position taken by the majority 
here. 
The record discloses that the state employees here involved 
worked overtime at the express command of their superiors 
with the promise of time off for the overtime, yet the ma-
jority denies them compensation therefor on the grounds that 
there is no statutory authority for the payment of such over-
time or promise to pay it, and that as to their claim for over-
time since the enactment of section 150.5 of the State Civil 
Serviee Act (Stats. 1937, ch. 753) in 1943 expressly provid-
ing for overtime pay, it is barred by the statute of limitation. 
The overtime pay here claimed must be allowed under 
Pohle v. Chr·istian, 21 Cal.2d 83 [130 P.2d 417]. In that case 
plaintiff sought to recover a lump sum for accumulated 
vaeation pay after he was separated from his position. It 
was held that he was entitled to pay for the vacation accumu-
lated prior to his severanee on the ground that sections 359c 
and 359d of the Political Code then authorized vacations and 
the accumulation of vacation time. It made no provision, 
hoVJever, for· payment o.f accumulated vacation time after 
separation from serv'ice, where the vacation was not taken 
prior to separation. That case has since been followed. (Clark 
v. State Personnel Board, 56 Cal.App.2d 499 [133 P.2d 11]; 
Ven·y v. Eckel, 61 Cal.App.2d 595 [143 P.2d 394].) The 
majority seeks to escape the effect of that case by asserting 
that at common law there is no right to recover for overtime 
when a person is hired by the month, and there is no statute 
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authorizing payment for overtime as there was authorizing a 
vacation in the Pohle case. Tn that reasoning the majority is 
in error. The statutes in foree at the time the overtime ser-
vice was rendered provided : ''Eight hours of labor consti-
tutes a day's work, unless it is otherwise expressly stipulated 
by the parties to a contract." (Lab. Code, § 510.) "Eight 
hours labor constitutes a legal day's work in all cases where 
the same is performed under the authority of any law of this 
State, or under the direction, or control, or by the authority 
of any officer of this State acting in his official capacity, or 
nnder the direction, or control or by the authority of any 
municipal corporation, or of any officer thereof." (Lab. Code, 
§ 1810.) ''Every person employed in any occupation of labor 
is entitled to one day's rest therefrom in seven." (Lab. Code, 
§ 551.) "No employer of labor shall cause his employees to 
work more than six days in seven.'' (Lab. Code, § 552.) While 
those provisions do not expressly state that they apply to the 
state as an employer, there is no reason why they should not 
inasmuch as they are not in derogation of the state's sover-
eignty and there is no reason why we should suppose that the 
I..egislature intended to require private employers to treat 
their employees in a more favorable manner than its own em-
ployees. There is, therefore, statutory authority which :fixes 
the hours of labor like that in the Pohle case which authorizes 
a vacation and an accumulation thereof for which pay may be 
recovered on separation from service. From such authority 
it follows that work beyond those hours is overtime and com-
pensation therefor should be paid the same as in the Pohle 
ease where it was held that from the establishment of the 
right to a vacation and to accumulate it, a right to be paid for 
the vacation when not taken ensued. Moreover, it should 
be noted that the heads of departments of the state "may 
arrange and classify the work of the department'' and adopt 
rules and regulations "necessary to govern the activities of 
the department" and may "assign" to its "employees such 
duties as it sees fit." (Gov. Code, § 11152.) Having that 
authority it could, as it did, require employees to work over-
time and make a valid promise to give time off in lieu thereof. 
Having failed to give the time off before the separation of the 
employee from service, like an untaken vacation in the Pohle 
ease, it is proper to award the employee money for the with-
held time off as was done for untaken vacation time in the 
Pohle case. It is clear, therefore, that there was statutory 
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authority for agreeing to give time off for overtime, and in 
lieu thereof compensation, and the Pohle case is controlling. 
In addition, however, the state is estopped to assert that 
the department of motor vehicles through the chief of the 
highway patrol did not have authority to promise time off 
for overtime. The case of Boren v. State Personnel Board, 
37 Cal.2d 634 [234 P.2d 981], is clearly distinguishable. In 
the Boren case there was positive statutory authority to trans-
fer an employee from one part of the state to another (here 
we have no positive statutory provision that there shall be 
no pay for overtime ; the statutes are to the contrary) and there 
was no showing in that case of unjust enrichment by the state 
at the expense of the employee as we have here. Here the 
employee was promised time off to compensate for overtime. 
In reliance thereon he gave extra time to the state. If the 
state may take that extra labor without paying for it as the 
majority holds, the state is being unjustly enriched at the 
expense of the employee. We have, therefore, a clear case of 
estoppel. There are many cases where estoppel may run 
against the government. (See cases cited, Farrell v. County 
of Placer, 23 Cal.2d 624, 628 [145 P.2d 570, 153 .A.L.R. 323] .) 
.A few instances may be pointed out in which the justice of 
invoking estoppel is present as much or even less than here. 
In Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Cou1·t, 3 Cal.2d 309 [ 44 P.2d 
547], the city of Los .Angeles was held estopped to abandon 
eminent domain proceedings where, in reliance thereon, de-
fendant property owner had acquired other property and con-
structed a building thereon. It was there said ( p. 330), "If 
the city had expressly agreed by its officers with defendants' 
grantors, even in parol, that a certain line should constitute 
the boundary line between the street and the grantor's prop-
erty, and upon the faith of such agreement the grantors had 
erected a block of buildings flush with the line of the street 
as agreed upon by all parties, it would be a hard law that 
would allow the city to repudiate that agreement, and destroy 
the grantor's property. No court should countenance such a 
thing, and an estoppel in pais will rise up in the pathway of 
a city to bar it and its principal, the people, from the com-
mission of such a grievous wrong ; and to give the acts of this 
city a very limited meaning we · think its conduct in the 
present case at least equivalent to an oral agreement as to 
the location of the true boundary line of the street." (To the 
same effect, see McGee v. City of Los Angeles, 6 Cal.2d 390 
[57 P.2d 925] .) In City of Los Angeles v. Cohn, 101 Cal. 
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373 [35 P. 1002], the city was estopped to claim property 
which it owned but said it did not and in reliance thereon 
the person who had. been in possession thereof built a build-
ing on it. The same situation, except it was a canal through 
a city, was involved in Fresno v. Fresno C. &; I. Co., 98 Cal. 
179 [32 P. 943]. Land claimed by the city as streets was 
considered in Sacramento v. Olunie 120 Cal. 29 [52 P. 44). 
In City of Los Angeles v. Oo1mty of Los Angeles, 9 Cal.2d 
624 [72 P.2d 138, 113 A.L.R. 370], a county was held estopped 
to collect from a railroad company additional payments for 
use of its land when it had been accepting certain payments 
for 15 years. In Contra Costa Water Go. v. Breed, 139 Cal. 
432 [73 P. 189], the city was held liable for water it re-
ceived and was estopped to deny liability on the claim that 
its ordinance providing for payment was invalid. In Tyra v. 
Board of Police etc. Oommrs., 32 Cal.2d 666 [197 P.2d 710], 
it was held that the city was estopped to plead the statute of 
limitation in an action by an employee for a pension where the 
pension commissioners had erroneously told him he could not 
receive a pension while he was receiving workmen's compensa-
tion. Baird v. City of Fresno, 97 Cal.App.2d 336 [217 P.2d 
681], is particularly applicable. It was there held that the city 
was estopped, when a pension was claimed, to rely on the 
invalidity of its determination made many years before that 
its employees should be credited with 9 years of service with 
the city. Mention is made in some of these cases that where 
there is general power authorizing action by a governmental 
body in a particular field, the government may be estopped 
to assert irregularity in the exercise of that power. Here 
we have the general power in the department (Gov. Code, 
§ 11152, supra) and it has been so recognized by this court 
(Nelson v. Dean, 27 Cal.2d 873 [168 P.2d 16, 168 A.L.R. 467] ). 
None of the foregoing authorities presents a clearer case for 
estoppel than the case at bar. 
I would, therefore, affirm the judgment. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-! would affirm the judgment. 
It is fundamental in California that before a trial court's 
judgment will be reversed on appeal the appellant must show 
that there has been error of law resulting in a miscarriage 
of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4%.) I do not find 
such showing here. 
There is no suggestion of fraud or overreaching on the 
part of either petitioner. Each faithfully discharged the 
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duties assigned to him and each during the periods of time 
involved worked many hours in excess of his regular hours 
of duty. Thus, during the years 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, and 
1943, Mr. Redwine worked a total of 370.75 overtime hours 
and was allowed 38 hours compensating time off, leaving a 
net balance of 332.75 compensating hours off due him. Dur-
ing 1941, 1942, and 1943, Mr. Martin performed a total of 
568.5 hours of overtime work and was allowed 32.5 hours 
of compensating time off, leaving a balance due him of 536 
compensating time off hours. 
During the period when the overtime balance was accru-
ing there appears to have been outstanding a ''Headquarters 
General Order" providing either that (Headquarters General 
Order No. 295) "Employees ordered to work beyond the 
hours ordinarily required or hours overtime in addition to 
what is considered their regular full day's work, may be 
allowed time off on the day following or at some other con-
venient time in lieu of the overtime hours worked,'' or that 
(Headquarters General Order No. 394) "Employees ordered 
to work beyond the hours ordinarily required and considered 
as a full days work may be allowed compensating time off 
in lieu of such overtime worked.' '1 
It thus appears that employes in the position of petitioners 
here were entitled to compensating time off to balance their 
overtime, such compensating time off to be allowed at the 
convenience of the employe's superior officer. Although (prior 
to February 6, 1943) there was no statute providing for cash 
payment in settlement for overtime worked it is quite ap-
parent that the state did expect to balance its accounts with 
employes for overtime services by allowing an equivalent 
amount of compensating time off. If the petitioners here 
had rE'mained in the state service indefinitely and had even-
tually, at the convenience of their superiors, been allowed the 
full amount of their overtime as compensating time off I 
think that neither this litigation nor any based on such allow-
ance would ever have arisen. 
'Headquarters General Order No. 295 was dated September 28, 1939, 
by itR terms became effective October 1, 1939, and superseded Head-
quarters General Order No. 243, issued July 23, 1936. Headquarters 
Gener~l Order No. 394 was dated August 5, 1942, and superseded No. 
:l!Hi. 'rhe substance of Headquarters General Order No. 243 is not shown 
here (it does appear in the companion case of Jarvi.q v. Henderson, post, 
p. 600 [255 P.2d 426]) but there is no contention that it differed 
materially from Nos. 295 and 394 in respect to the allowance of com-
pensating time off for overtime worked. 
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However, apparently in recognition of the fact that em-
ployes who had accumulated substantial amounts of over-
time credits might not be able to remain in their employment 
long enough to >York out a balancing of the account on a com-
pensating time off basis and that there might be a serious 
question as to the right of the employe to assert, or the 
state to pay in cash, claims for the value of the overtime which 
might remain uncompensated upon a separation from service, 
1he State Civil Service Act was amended to cover the situation. 
Effective Pebruary 6, 1943, section 150.5 was added. It pro-
vides (Stats. 1!)43, ch. 20, § 2, p. 136; now Gov. Code, § 18005) : 
''Upon separation from service without fault on his part, a 
person is entitled to a lump sum payment as of the time 
of separation for any unused or accumulated vacation or for 
any time off to which he is entitled by reason of previous over-
time work where compensating time off for overtime work is 
provided for by the appointing power or by rules of the State 
Prrsounel Board. 
''Such sum shall be computed by projecting the accumu-
lated time on a calendar basis so that the lump sum will 
equal the amount which the employee would have been paid 
had he taken the time off but not separated from the service. 
Persons separated from service through fault of their own are 
entitled to a lump sum payment for such compensating time 
off for overtime vvork, similarly computed, and in addition, 
such portion, if any, of unused vacation as the State Per-
sonnel Board may determine. '' 
I see no valid objection to applying such section to the 
petitioners here. Their service extended beyond the effective 
elate of the quoted statute. Up to and at the time of their 
separation, the trial court was justified in concluding, they 
had a right to compensating time off. The state could settle 
that account with them either by permitting them to continue 
in employment at the prevailing current wage until they had 
been given compensating time off to fully balance their ac-
emnulated overtime or, by virtue of the quoted statute, which 
we must presume the Legislature found good reason for en-
acting, it could settle by the "lump sum payment." That the 
''lump sum payment'' was more desirable to the state than 
having the employe continue on the payroll, occupying a 
position but on a time off basis until his accumulated over-
time was fully offset, is readily understandable. The state 
may well have needed to fill the position with a person who 
would be immediately available for work. Upon separation 
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from the Rerviee without fault on their part the petitioners, 
by virtue of the statute, became entitled to the "lump sum 
payment.'' This is no gift of public money; it does not present 
petitioners with anything of value which they have not 
earned; it is merely an alternative method of settling a cur-
rent account which the state has found to be advantageous to it. 
Much that is said in my dissent in Treu v. Kirkwood, *(Cal.) 
255 P.2d 409, is equally applicable here. 
Since no error of law resulting in miscarriage of justice is 
shown the judgment should be affirmed. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied April 30, 
1953. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
. [Sac. No. 6281. In Bank. Apr. 3, 1953.] 
L. J. JARVIS, Petitioner and Appellant, v. A. H. HENDER-
SON, as Director of the Department of Motor V chicles, 
etc., et al., Respondents and Appellants. 
[1] Civil Service- Statutory Authorization.- A state highway 
patrol officer's appointment was not contractual, based on the 
assumption that he was appointed in 1931 by the board of 
supervisors of his county pursuant to California Vehicle Act 
of 1923, § 30 (Stats, 1923, ch. 266, p. 520), where, prior to 
his appointment, the statute had been amended to provide 
for appointment of traffic officers by the chief of the patrol 
with salaries fixed by the director of public works and to 
bring all appointees within civil service status (Stats. 1929, 
ch. 308, pp. 617-619), and the amendment eliminated the prior 
provision for appointment by contract between the chief of 
the division and the board of supervisors. 
[2] Id.-Compensation.-The salary of a civil service employee 
is fixed by statute and rule of the State Personnel Board, 
and may not be altered by contract. 
[3] !d.-Compensation-Overtime Work.-In the absence of a 
statute specifically authorizing compensation to a civil serv-
[2] See Cal.Jur., Civil Service, § 6; Am.Jur., Civil Service, § 17. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Civil Service, § 1; [2, 3, 6, 7] Civil 
Service, § 8; [ 4, 5] Labor, § 4.5. 
*A rehearing was granted by the Supreme Court on May 1, 1953. 
